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Floyd v. Lykes (Cont.) 
ISSUE: Is it proper for a ships captain to perform a burial at 
sea, without prior notification of the next-of-kin, when the vessel 
is eight days from port? 
ANALYSIS: Plaintiff argued on appeal that state tort law 
established a quasi-property right to the body of the deceased in 
the next-of-kin and that state law was or should be incorporated 
into the general maritime law. Agreeing that maritime law 
applied and citing Igneri v. Cie de Transports Oceaniques, 323 
F.2d 257,259 (2d Cir. 1963), cert denied 376 U.S. 949 (1964), the 
court held that it could "look to the law prevailing on the land" 
only when the maritime law was silent. Absent a maritime 
statute, the case should be governed by general maritime case 
law, United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409 
(1975); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 160-61 
( 1920), and state law may not be applied where it would conflict 
with maritime law, Coastal Iron Works, Inc. v. Petty Ray 
Geophysical, 783 F.2d 577, 582 (5th Cir. 1986). 
The court looked to Brambir v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 37 F. 
Supp. 906, 907 <S.D.N.Y. 1940), affd mem., 119 F2.d 419 (2d 
Cir. 1941), as the leading case on point. In that case a passenger 
died eight days from port and the court held that the ship's 
master had absolute discretion over the fate of the corpse. 
Further, burial at sea is recognized as a viable option by master, 
vessel and medical guidebooks. 
Defendant cited Finley v. Atlantic Transport Co., 220 N.Y. 
249, 115 N.E. 715 (1917) to support its case. There, defendant 
provided an embalmer and morgue and additionally, was only 
twenty hours from port when the burial was effected. Other 
than this easily distinguishable case, the only authority to 
support defendant's claim was a publication by the United 
States Public Health Service entitled The Ships Medicine Chest 
and Medical Aid at Sea. That handbook contained the statement 
"[t]oday burial at sea is the exception". But no expansion of this 
statement was offered, leaving the reader inconclusive as to 
whether the meaning was that death at sea was the exception 
today due to advances in medicine and technology, or that lack 
of embalming and mortuary facilities was the exception, etc. 
Thus the plaintiffs case failed for lack of any evidence in support 
of her cause of action. 
In affirming the lower court's decision the court of appeals 
noted that plaintiff offered no statutes, cases or authorities to 
contradict Brambir's holding, that nothing in the Death on the 
High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§761-68, or the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 
§688, prohibited burial at sea, and that no abuse of discretion on 
the part of the captain had been demonstrated. the court in­
sinuated that certain proof not present in the instant case might 
have allowed the action to go forward. Examples of such facts 
were if the ship had embalming and mortuary facilities (vessels 
refrigerated food locker not appropriate), or if the plaintiff had 
demonstrated both a willingness to reimburse Lykes for its 
expenses for an unplanned docking at a closer port plus the 
willingness of the port country to accept an unembalmed 
cadaver, or if the captain's decision could be classified as "ar­
bitrary, fanciful or unreasonable". 
Harold Levy '90 
SCAC TRANSPORT (USA) INC. v. S.S. DANAOS 
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 25 Aprill988 
845 F .2d 1 157 
A stevedore whose negligence has been determined to be the proximate cause of the litigation can be vouched into 
arbitration proceedings without its consent and be bound by the findings of the arbitrator. 
FACTS: The S.S. Danaos was loading cargo on a vessel when 
an accident occurred wherein the vessel's Stulken Boom collapsed 
when a pin in a winch block failed during the loading of a water 
tank truck. The truck, boom and parts of the vessel suffered 
damage. The vessel, owned by Danais Shipping Company 
(Danais), was under a time charter to Big Lift USA, Inc. and Big 
Lift Shipping Company (N.A.) Inc. (Big Lift), collectively which 
had contracted with Universal Maritime Service Corp. (Universal) 
for the stevedoring services. 
The truck's owner SCAC Transport (SCAC) commenced this 
action against Danais, Big Lift and the S.S. Danaos in rem. 
Danais cross claimed against Big Lift for indemnity. Universal 
was brought into the action by a third party claim and was cross 
claimed for indemnification by Big Lift. SCAC settled with 
Danais. Pursuant to the charter-party between Danais and Big 
Lift any dispute was to be arbitrated in London. Universal was 
not a party to this agreement. 
Big Lift tendered the defense to Universal with regard to the 
London arbitration and required Universal to appear in defense 
of the action and to indemnify Big Lift. Universal was advised 
that refusal or neglect of the notice would bar it from objecting to 
the outcome of the arbitration. 
The arbitration ruling was in favor of Danais, and the steve­
dore's negligence was found to be the proximate cause. Damages 
included vessel repairs, loss of charter hire, interest and at­
torney's fees. Universal again declined to assume the defense, 
when Big Lift informed it that an appeal before the Commercial 
Court in London was to be heard. After Universal declined to 
assume defense of the claim and prosecution of the special cases, 
Big Lift instructed its London solicitors to terminate appeal. Big 
Lift then commenced an action in the District Court. 
The District Court, affirming the finding of the London arbit­
ration as to negligence, found that Big Lift was entitled to 
indemnity. The damages awarded, however, did not include 
attorney's fees becuase the court determined they were beyond 
what Universal could reasonably contemplate when hired as a 
stevedore. 
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ISSUE: Whether a stevedore without its consent may be 
vouched into an arbitration where the stevedore is the charterer's 
indemnitor? 
ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
reversed the district court and held that absent a particularized 
showing of prejudice, a stevedore may be vouched into arbitration 
under a charter party by a charterer where the stevedore is the 
charterer's indemnitor. The district court's decision as to at-
torney's fees was reversed. 
' 
Under the common-law practice of voucher, a defendant or 
indemnitee who seeks indemnification from a third party or 
indemnitor must serve a notice to defend on the third party. This 
notice informs the indemnitor of the action against the de­
fendant and offers the opportunity to defend the action. 
If the defense is not assumed, the defendant may bring a 
separate action later to recover its indemnity. The indemnitor 
can dispute the existence and extent of the indemnity. See 
Humble Oil & Ref Co. v. Philadelphia Ship Maintenance Co., 
444 F.2d 727 (3rd Cir. 1971). The third party will be collaterally 
estopped from relitigating issues decided in the first action in all 
of the elements of the adjudicatory procedure are met. 
Arbitration is cited as an important, efficient and equitable 
means of dispute resolution when arbitrators are experienced in 
maritime matters and the evidence is extensive. The Second 
Circuit noted the procedural aspects of arbitration and court 
adjudication and concluded contrary to the district court's rul­
ing that the notice received by Universal had no preclusive 
effect; that absent a particularized showing of harm, procedural 
differences between arbitration and the judicial process are not 
grounds for denying a preclusive effect to vouching in notice. 
Universal did not demonstrate any prejudice suffered as a result 
of the London arbitration. 
For reasons of efficiency vouching is permitted. Stevedores 
are well aware that charter parties contain arbitration clauses 
to which they as potential indemnitees are bound. Absent a 
(Continued ... ) 
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showing of prejuduce there is no reason to subject a party to 
multiple proceedings. 
The court concluded that a stevedore must indemnify a ship­
owner or charterer to whom it has contracted to provide 
stevedoring services for losses that party sustains from the 
stevedore's breach of its warranty of workmanlike service. See 
Saks Infl Inc. v. M/V Export Champion, 817 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 
1987). This obligation of indemnity extends to litigation ex­
penses incurred by the shipowner in defense of any suit brought 
against it as a result of such breach. 
Melanie A. Wood '90 
OLIVERI v. DELTA STEAMSHIP LINES, INC. 
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1 June 1988 
849 F.2d 742 
The same preset value discount rate used in diminishing awards for future pecuniary losses should be used in diminishing 
awards for future pain and suffering. 
FACTS: A licensed third assistant engineer brought an action 
against the shipowner, Midland Ross Corporation (Midland), 
under the Jones Act to recover damages for injuries to his foot 
suffered while working on a vessel. The district court admitted 
testimony by a union representative as to the probable loss of 
future wages and promotional benefits of an average new 
member. The judge instructed the jury that it did not have to 
accept the testimony and also that it was to render an unadjusted 
award for both future pecuniary and non-pecuinary loss. The 
jury awarded $240,000 for lost future earnings and $50,000 for 
future pain and suffering. The judge subsequently deducted 2'k 
from the award for present value discount purposes. Delta ap­
pealed on the grounds that evidence regarding Oliveri's future 
earning capacity was improperly admitted and that the present 
value discount calculation was incorrectly performed. 
ISSUES: 1. Is testimony from an official of the union, which 
the injured plaintiff was barred from joining, admissible as 
evidence to ascertain the lost expected earnings? 
2. Whether the same present value discount value 
rate employed in diminishing awards for future pecuniary los­
ses should also be used in diminishing awards for future pain 
and suffering? 
ANALYSIS: 1. The Court of Appeals admitted the testimony 
as evidence stating that the court has wide discretion in deciding 
to admit testimony of any witness. Admissions of such testimony 
will more likely be upheld when the evidence used to establish 
lost future pecuniary gains is backed by empirical evidence such 
as wage scales and contracts of employment. The data presented 
to the jury must be sufficiently clear so that the jury could 
reasonably assess the plaintiffs chances of promotion and sal­
ary incrementation over the years. Furthermore, the court must 
clearly instruct the jury that they may disregard any parts of or 
the entire testimony of a witness. 
2. The Court of Appeals remanded to the lower 
court only the issue of the proper calculation of the discount rate 
for future pecuniary loss, holding the lower court erred when it 
reduced the jury award by a one time flat 29l- deduction from the 
total amount. The court cannot take away this prerogative from 
the jury without stipulation from both parties. The Court of 
Appeals did not find such stipulation, and therefore the issue of 
the present value discount to be deducted was to be retried 
before a new jury. This amount would be deducted from the 
lump sum award of the previous jury. 
The two components to this deduction are the projected infla­
tion rate, and the projected rate of return on a risk free invest-
ment over the period the plaintiff would lose his expected wages. 
Given this, the amount that the jury awards is deemed as taking 
the discount rate into consideration. However, if by party stipu­
lation the discounting is left to the judge then the court must 
instruct the jury not to incorporate discounting in their calcula­
tion. The judge will calculate it using the 2% per year standard. 
Furthermore, if the plaintiff shows that the jury, despite the 
instructions of the court, incorporated the discount rate in their 
final award the judge had to accept this and not further di­
minish award. 
The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's determination 
of a one time, 2% reduction of the jury award for non-pecuniary 
future loss. The court acknowledged that several older decisions 
from this circuit held contrary to imposing any kind of reduction 
of lost future non-pecuniary gain. See Alexander N ash-Kelvinator 
Corp., 271 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1959); Yodice v. Koninklijke 
Nederlandsche Stoombot Maatschappij, 443 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 
1971); and Rapisardi v. United Fruit Co., 441 F.2d 1308 (2d Cir. 
1971). However, starting with Chiarello v. Domenico Bus Service 
Inc., 542 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1976), the court stated that "disCount­
ing was not only appropriate but preferable." /d. at 886. lnMetz v. 
United Technologies Corp., 754 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1985), the court 
set the rule that the discount rate used would be below the rate 
used when calculating lost pecuniary expectancy. "All that is 
essential is to reach a result that properly takes into account the 
time value of money." 764 F.2d at 68 n.3. The court, allowed the 
29l- reduction in the award to stand. Recognizing the discrepancy 
with the majority of other circuit and state courts, it went on to 
say that "[i]f we were writing on a clear slate, we might be 
inclined to accept the view of the other circuits and reject any 
discounting of future non-pecuniary losses. However, we are ob­
liged to reckon with the clear preference for discounting expres­
sed by this circuit ... " 849 F.2d at 751. 
The court allowed the award to be diminished in an express 
attempt not to prejudice the plaintiff here by ordering a new trial 
on this issue as well. The defendants, in trying to get as large a 
present value discounting as possible will seek to keep the calcu­
lation away from the court, and to present the jury with as high 
discount rate figures as possible in order to minimize the final 
award. Injured plaintiffs in seeking higher awards will try to 
have the court decide the issue. It seems that given the court's 
rationale, the acknowledgment of its minority view, and its in­
terest in keeping uniformity throughout the circuits, the court 
may be persuaded to follow the majority view in the future and 
not allow present value deduction on future pain and suffering 
losses. 
Kimon C. Thermos '90 
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